Abstract. We present new preservation theorems that semantically characterize the ∃ k ∀ * and ∀ k ∃ * prefix classes of first order logic, for each natural number k. Unlike preservation theorems in the literature that characterize the ∃ * ∀ * and ∀ * ∃ * prefix classes, our theorems relate the count of quantifiers in the leading block of the quantifier prefix to natural quantitative properties of the models. As special cases of our results, we obtain the classical Łoś-Tarski preservation theorem for sentences in both its extensional and substructural versions. For arbitrary finite vocabularies, we also generalize the extensional version of the Łoś-Tarski preservation theorem for theories. We also present an interpolant-based approach towards these results. Finally, we present partial results towards generalizing to theories, the substructural version of the Łoś-Tarski theorem and in the process, we give a preservation theorem that provides a semantic characterization of Σ 0 n theories for each natural number n.
Introduction
Preservation theorems in first order logic (henceforth called FO) have been extensively studied in model theory. A FO preservation theorem for a model-theoretic operation syntactically characterizes FO definable classes of structures that are preserved under that operation. A classical preservation theorem (also one of the earliest) is the Łoś-Tarski theorem, which states that over arbitrary structures, a FO sentence is preserved under substructures iff it is equivalent to a universal sentence [1] . In dual form, the theorem states that a FO sentence is preserved under extensions iff it is equivalent to an existential sentence. It is well-known that if the vocabulary is relational, the sizes of the minimal models of a sentence preserved under extensions are no larger than the number of quantifiers in an equivalent existential sentence. Thus, the dual version of the Łoś-Tarski theorem not only asserts the equivalence of a syntactic and a semantic class of FO sentences, but also yields a relation between a quantitative model-theoretic property (i.e., sizes of minimal models) of a sentence in the semantic class and the count of quantifiers in an equivalent sentence in the syntactic class. Counts of quantifiers are known to have a bearing on the parameterized complexity, and even decidability, of satisfiability checking of various syntactic classes of FO [2] . For example, consider the class of prenex FO sentences, over a relational vocabulary, having a prefix structure of the form ∃ * ∀ * . It is known that satisfiability checking for this class is in NTIME((nk m ) c ), where n is the length of the sentence, k and m are the number of existential and universal quantifiers respectively in the sentence, and c is a suitable constant [2] . Similarly, for each k ≥ 2, satisfiability checking for the class of sentences of the form ∀ k ∃ * ϕ where ϕ is quantifier-free, is undecidable if equality is allowed in ϕ [2] . It is therefore interesting to study preservation theorems that relate quantitative properties of models of sentences in a semantic class to counts of quantifiers of equivalent sentences in a syntactic class. In recent years, there has been significant interest in syntactic classes of FO with one quantifier alternation in the context of program verification, program synthesis and other applications [3] [4] [5] . The literature contains several semantic characterizations for these syntactic classes using notions such as ascending chains, descending chains, and 1-sandwiches [1] (also see Appendix A). However, none of these relate quantifier counts to any model-theoretic properties. In this paper, we take a step towards addressing this problem. Specifically, we present preservation theorems that provide new semantic characterizations of sentences in prenex normal form with quantifier prefixes of the form ∃ k ∀ * and ∀ k ∃ * . Our theorems relate the count k of quantifiers in the leading block of quantifiers to quantitative properties of the models.
The present work builds on notions introduced earlier in [6] , specifically, those of cores and substructures modulo bounded cores. It was conjectured in [6] that for every natural number k, a FO sentence is preserved under substructures modulo k-sized cores iff it is equivalent to a prenex sentence with quantifier prefix of the form ∃ k ∀ * . In this paper, we formally prove this conjecture over arbitrary structures. This gives us a preservation theorem that generalizes the substructural version of the Łoś-Tarski theorem for FO sentences. Our proof approach consists of introducing a notion dual to that of substructures modulo k-sized cores, and then proving a dual version of the original conjecture. Interestingly, the dual version of the conjecture leads to a generalization of the extensional form of the Łoś-Tarski theorem for sentences. To the best of our knowledge, our characterizations are the first to relate natural quantitative properties of models of sentences in a semantic class to the count of quantifiers in equivalent ∃ * ∀ * or ∀ * ∃ * sentences. For arbitrary finite vocabularies, we also generalize the extensional version of the Łoś-Tarski theorem for theories. We also present interpolant-based semantic characterizations of the same syntactic classes as considered above. Finally we present our partial results towards generalizing the substructural version of the Łoś-Tarski theorem for theories over arbitrary finite vocabularies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall relevant notions, results and the aforementioned conjecture from [6] . Section 3 introduces a generalization of the classical notion of "preservation under extensions" and formulates a dual version of the conjecture in terms of this notion. In Section 4, we formally prove the dual formulation of the conjecture, thereby proving the original conjecture as well. In Sections 5 and 6, we consider natural generalizations of our notions and results, that yield a more general set of preservation theorems. In particular, we prove a generalization of the extensional version of the Łoś-Tarski theorem. An interpolant-based approach to proving the results proved till Section 6 is presented in Section 7. In Sections 8 and 9, we present partial results towards generalizing the substructural version of the Łoś-Tarski theorem -in particular, we show that theories that are preserved under substructures modulo k-sized cores are equivalent to Σ 0 2 theories. We also show that the latter kind of theories are more general than the former kind. In this process, we prove a preservation theorem that provides a semantic characterization of Σ 0 n theories for each natural number n. Finally, we conclude in Section 10 with some discussion and directions for future work.
Background
We assume that the reader is familiar with standard notation and terminology used in the syntax and semantics of FO (see [1] ). A vocabulary τ is a set of predicate, function and constant symbols. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to finite vocabularies. We denote by F O(τ ) the set of all FO formulae over vocabulary τ . A sequence (x 1 , . . . , x k ) of variables is denoted byx. A F O(τ ) formula ψ having free variablesx is denoted by ψ(x). A formula with no free variables is called a sentence. A theory, resp. theory over τ , is a set of sentences, resp. F O(τ ) sentences. We abbreviate a block of quantifiers of the form Qx 1 . . . Qx k by Qx, where Q ∈ {∀, ∃}. We denote the natural numbers including zero by N. For every non-zero k ∈ N, we denote by Σ 0 k (resp. Π 0 k ), all FO sentences in prenex normal form, whose quantifier prefix begins with a ∃ (resp. ∀) and consists of k − 1 alternations of quantifiers. We use the standard notions of τ -structures, substructures (denoted as M ⊆ N ) and extensions, as defined in [1] , and study preservation theorems over arbitrary structures. By the size (or power) of a structure M , we mean the cardinality of its universe, and denote it by |M |. A class of structures is called elementary (resp. basic elementary) if it is definable by a FO theory (resp. an FO sentence). In this paper, we restrict ourselves to definability by FO sentences until Section 6. Subsequently, we relax this restriction to also include definability by formulae and theories. We begin by recalling a generalization of the notion of "preservation under substructures", introduced in [6] .
Definition 1 (ref. [6] ) For k ∈ N, a class S of structures is said to be preserved under substructures modulo k-sized cores, denoted by S ∈ PSC(k), if for every structure M ∈ S, there exists an at most k-sized subset C of the universe of M such that if N ⊆ M and N contains C, then N ∈ S. The set C is called a core of M w.r.t. S. If S is clear from context, we simply call C a core of M .
An example of a class in PSC(0) (and hence in PSC(k) for every k ∈ N) is the class of all acyclic directed graphs 1 . It is well known that this class is not FO-definable. Hence, PSC(k) contains classes not definable in FO for every k ∈ N. Let P SC(k) denote the collection of FO-definable classes in PSC(k). We identify classes in P SC(k) with their defining FO sentences. As an example, for k ∈ N, consider the class S k of all graphs containing a k length cycle as a subgraph. It is clear that for any graph G in S k , the vertices of any cycle of length k in G form a core of G. Hence S k ∈ PSC(k). Since S k is definable using a Σ 0 1 sentence φ having k existential quantifiers, we say that the defining sentence φ is in P SC(k).
Since PSC(0) coincides with the property of preservation under substructures, we abbreviate PSC(0) as PS and P SC(0) as P S in the following discussion. The substructural version of the Łoś-Tarski theorem for sentences can now be stated as follows.
Theorem 1 (Łoś-Tarski).
A sentence is in P S iff it is equivalent to a Π 0 1 sentence.
In attempting a syntactic characterization of P SC(k) that generalizes Theorem 1, the statement of the following theorem was put forth as a conjecture in [6] . While it was shown to hold in several special cases, it was not resolved in its entirety. In this paper, we formally prove the conjecture in its generality.
Theorem 2.
A sentence is in P SC(k) iff it is equivalent to a Σ 0 2 sentence with k existential quantifiers.
It is easy to see that given a Σ 0 2 sentence φ ≡ ∃x 1 . . . ∃x k ∀ȳ ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ,ȳ) and a structure M such that M |= φ, the witnesses a 1 , . . . , a k of x 1 , . . . , x k for which M |= ∀ȳ ϕ(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k ,ȳ) form a core of M . Therefore, φ ∈ P SC(k). However, contrary to intuition, witnesses and cores cannot always be equated! For example, consider the sentence φ ≡ ∃x∀yE(x, y) ∈ P SC(1) and the structure M = (N, ≤) (i.e. the natural numbers with the usual ordering). Clearly, M |= φ and the only witness for x is the minimum element 0 ∈ N. In contrast, every singleton subset of N forms a core of M ! This is because, N being well-ordered by ≤, for every x ∈ N, every substructure of M containing x has a minimum element. Therefore, there are many more cores than witnesses in this example. In light of Theorem 1, it is easy to see that for relational vocabularies, if φ ∈ P S, then φ must be equivalent to a sentence of the form ψ ≡ ∀y 1 . . . ∀y l φ| {y1,...,y l } for some l ∈ N, where φ| {y1,...,y l } is a quantifier-free relativized formula asserting that φ is true in the substructure induced by y 1 , . . . , y l (see [6] for details). In other words, checking the truth of φ (known to be in P S) in a structure M amounts to checking its truth for all finite substructures of M upto a suitably large size. In view of this, it is tempting to claim that if φ ∈ P SC(k), then checking the truth of φ in a structure M amounts to finding a subset C of M of size at most k and checking the truth of φ in all suitably large but finite substructures of M that contain C. However, this claim is incorrect. To see why this is so, consider φ ≡ ∃x∀yE(x, y) and the structure M = (Z, ≤) (i.e., integers with the usual ordering). Clearly φ ∈ P SC(1) and M |= φ. However, every finite substructure of M has a minimum element, and hence models φ! This example illustrates a key difference between Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Specifically, although Theorem 2 asserts that every φ ∈ P SC(k) is equivalent to a sentence of the form ∃ k ∀ * ϕ where ϕ is quantifier-free, it reveals no information about the form of ϕ. As defined in [6] , let PSC = k≥0 PSC(k) and P SC = k≥0 P SC(k). Then Theorem 2 yields the following corollary, which was proven using other techniques in [6] .
Corollary 1 (ref. [6]).
A sentence is in P SC iff it is equivalent to a Σ 0 2 sentence.
The next two sections introduce a notion dual to that of preservation under substructures modulo k-sized cores, formulate a dual version of Theorem 2 using this notion, and provide a proof of the dual formulation. A proof of Theorem 2 follows immediately from the dual result.
Preservation under k-ary Covered Extensions
The classical notion of "extension of a structure" can be naturally generalized to extension of a collection of structures as follows. A structure M is said to be an extension of a collection R of structures if for each N ∈ R, we have N ⊆ M . We now define a special kind of extensions of a collection of structures.
Definition 2
For k ∈ N, a structure M is said to be a k-ary covered extension of a non-empty collection R of structures if (i) M is an extension of R, and (ii) for every subset S, of size at most k, of the universe of M , there is a structure in R that contains S. We call R a k-ary cover of M .
As an example, let M be a graph on n vertices and let R be the collection of all r sized induced subgraphs of M , where 1 ≤ r < n. Then M is a k-ary covered extension of R for every k in {0, . . . , r}. Note that a 0-ary covered extension of R is simply an extension of R. For k > 0, the universe of a k-ary covered extension of R is necessarily the union of the universes of the structures in R. However, different k-ary extensions of R can differ in the interpretation of predicates (if any) of arity greater than k. Note also that a k-ary covered extension of R is an l-ary covered extension of R for every l ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
Definition 3
Given k ∈ N, a class S of structures is said to be preserved under k-ary
An example of a class in PCE(k) is the class S k of all graphs not containing a cycle of length k. Let M be a k-ary covered extension of R, where R is a collection of structures of S k . It is easy to see that M is also in S k . For if not, M must contain a cycle of length k. As R is a k-ary cover of M , this cycle must be contained in some N ∈ R. This contradicts the fact that N ∈ S k . Let the collection of FO definable classes in PCE(k) be denoted by P CE(k). As before, we identify classes in P CE(k) with their defining FO sentences. It is easy to see that if l, k ∈ N and if l ≤ k, then PCE(l) ⊆ PCE(k) and P CE(l) ⊆ P CE(k). Furthermore, the heirarchies within PCE and P CE are strict. Consider φ ∈ P CE(k) over the empty vocabulary given by φ = ∀x 1 . . . ∀x k 1≤i<j≤k (x i = x j ). The sentence φ asserts that there are strictly fewer than k elements in any model. It is easy to see that φ ∈ P CE(k). To see that φ / ∈ P CE(l) for l < k, consider M containing exactly k elements in its universe. Clearly M |= φ. Consider the collection R of all l-sized substructures of M . It is easy to check that R is a l-ary cover for M . However each structure in R models φ. Then φ / ∈ P CE(l) for l < k. This shows the strict heirarchy within P CE. The above argument also shows that PCE(l) is strictly contained in PCE(k) -φ witnesses this strict inclusion. The classical notion of preservation under extensions is easily seen to coincide with PCE(0). This is because a class of structures S is preserved under extensions iff it is preserved under extensions of any collection R of structures in S. This motivates abbreviating PCE(0) as PE and P CE(0) as P E in the subsequent discussion. Analogous to the definitions of PSC and P SC, we define PCE = k≥0 PCE(k) and P CE = k≥0 P CE(k). The strictness of the PCE(k) and P CE(k) hierarchies imply that PCE and P CE strictly generalize PE and P E respectively. With the above notation, the extensional version of the Łoś-Tarski theorem for sentences can be stated as follows.
Theorem 3 (Łoś-Tarski).
A sentence is in P E iff it is equivalent to a Σ 0 1 sentence. The duality between PSC(k) and PCE(k) is formalized by the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (PSC(k)-PCE(k) duality). A class S of structures is in
Then there exists M ∈ S s.t. for every set A of at most k elements from M , there is a substructure N A of M that contains A but is not in S. In other words, N A ∈ S. Then R = {N A | A is a subset, of size at most k, of M } is a k-ary cover of M . Since N A ∈ S for all N A ∈ R and since S ∈ PCE(k), it follows that M ∈ S -a contradiction. Only If: Suppose S ∈ PSC(k) but S / ∈ PCE(k). Then there exists M ∈ S and a k-ary cover R of M such that every structure N ∈ R belongs to S. Since M ∈ S, there exists a core C of M w.r.t. S of size at most k. Consider the structure N C ∈ R that contains C -this exists since R is a k-ary cover of M . Then N C ∈ S since C is a core of M -a contradiction.
Corollary 2. Let φ be a FO sentence. Then φ ∈ P SC(k) iff ¬φ ∈ P CE(k).
As seen earlier, all Σ 0 2 sentences with k existential quantifiers are in P SC(k). By Corollary 2, all Π 0 2 sentences with k universal quantifiers are in P CE(k). In the next section, we show that the converse is also true, yielding the following theorem. 
Theorem 4. A sentence is in P CE(k) iff it is equivalent to a Π

Proof of Theorem 4
We begin by recalling some notions from classical model theory [1] . Given a vocabulary τ and a cardinal α, let τ α be the vocabulary obtained by expanding τ with fresh constants c 1 , . . . , c α . Given a τ -structure M , the theory of
is a maximally consistent set of τ -formulae having a single free variable v. In other words, for every τ -formula ψ(v), exactly one of ψ or ¬ψ belongs to Σ(v). A structure M is said to realize the type Σ(v) if there is an element a of M such that M |= Σ(a). Finally, we recall the notion of saturation, which is crucially used in our proof.
Our proof makes use of the following results from Chapter 5 of [1] .
Proposition 1 (ref. [1]).
Given an infinite cardinal λ and a λ-saturated τ -structure M , for every k-tuple (a 1 , . . . , a k ) of elements from M where k ∈ N, the τ k structure (M, a 1 , . . . , a k ) is also λ-saturated.
Proposition 2 (ref. [1]).
A τ -structure is finite iff it is λ-saturated for all cardinals λ. Towards our syntactic characterization of P CE(k), we first prove the following.
Lemma 2. Let τ be a finite vocabulary and let T be a consistent theory over
Proof : We show that for every subset S, of size at most k, of the universe of M , there is a substructure M s of M containing S such that M s |= T . Then the set K = {M s | S is a subset, of size at most k, of the universe of M } forms the desired k-ary cover of M . Let S = {a 1 , . . . , a r } be a subset of the universe of M , where r ≤ k. To show the existence of M s , it suffices to show that there exists a τ r -structure N such that (i)
Then, from Theorem 6, N is isomorphically embeddable into (M, a 1 , . . . , a r ). Then the τ -reduct of the copy of N in (M, a 1 , . . . , a r ) can serve as M s . The proof is therefore completed by showing the existence of N with the above properties. Let P be the set of all ∀ * sentences of F O(τ r ) that are true in (M, a 1 , . . . , a r ). Suppose Z = T ∪ P is inconsistent. By the compactness theorem, there is a finite subset of Z that is inconsistent. Since P is closed under taking finite conjunctions and since each of P and T is consistent, there is a sentence ψ in P such that T ∪ {ψ} is inconsistent. In other words, T → ¬ψ. Since T is a theory over τ and ψ is a sentence over τ r , by ∀-introduction, we have T → ϕ, where ϕ ≡ ∀x 1 . . . ∀x r ¬ψ[c 1 → x 1 ; . . . ; c r → x r ], the variables x 1 , . . . , x r are fresh, and c i → x i denotes substitution of c i by x i . Since ¬ψ is a ∃ * sentence over τ r , ϕ is a ∀ r ∃ * sentence over τ . Since r ≤ k, ϕ can be seen as a ∀ k ∃ * sentence (by introducing redundant ∀s if r < k). By the definition of Γ , we must have ϕ ∈ Γ , and hence M |= ϕ. In other words, (M, a 1 , . . . , a r ) |= ¬ψ. This contradicts the fact that ψ ∈ P . Therefore, Z must be consistent. By Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, there is a model N of Z of power at most λ. Since N models every ∀ * sentence true in (M, a 1 , . . . , a r ), every ∃ * sentence true in N must be true in (M, a 1 , . . . , a r ). Finally, since N |= T , N is indeed as desired.
We complete the proof of Theorem 4 now. If φ is unsatisfiable, we are done. Otherwise, let Γ be the set of all ∀ k ∃ * consequences of φ. Clearly, φ → Γ . For the converse, suppose M |= Γ . By Corollary 4, there is a β−saturated elementary extension M + of M for some β ≥ ω. Then M + |= Γ . Taking T = {φ}, by Lemma 2, there exists a k-ary cover R of M + such that for every N ∈ R, N |= T i.e. N |= φ. Since φ ∈ P CE(k), it follows that M + |= φ. As M + and M are elementarily equivalent, M |= φ and hence Γ → φ. This shows that φ ↔ Γ . By the compactness theorem, φ is equivalent to a finite conjunction of sentences of Γ . Since Γ is closed under finite conjunctions, φ is equivalent to a ∀ k ∃ * sentence.
We remark that the above proof goes through over any class of structures satisfying the compactness theorem. As a special case then, Theorem 4 and (hence) Theorem 2 are true modulo theories. Thus, we get a complete subsumption of the Łoś-Tarski theorem for sentences in both its senses, primal and dual.
Finite Cores and Finitary Covers
We recall from [6] the following notion which generalizes PSC(k).
Definition 5 (ref. [6])
A class S of structures is said to be preserved under substructures modulo a finite core, denoted S ∈ PSC f , if for every structure M ∈ S, there exists a finite subset C of the universe of M such that if N ⊆ M and N contains C, then N ∈ S. The set C is called a core of M w.r.t. S.
As an example, the class S of graphs containing cycles is in PSC f . Since PSC f contains classes like S that are not FO definable, we let P SC f denote the collection of FO definable classes in PSC f . We identify classes in P SC f with their defining FO sentences. The following results were then proved.
Theorem 7 (ref. [6]).
A sentence is in P SC f iff it is equivalent to a Σ 0 2 sentence. Corollary 5 (ref. [6] ). P SC f = P SC.
Lemma 3 (ref. [6]).
For every recursive function f : N → N, there is a sentence φ ∈ P SC f which is not in P SC(k) for any k ≤ f (|φ|).
We now give analogous notions and results in the dual setting. We first define the notion of a finitary covered extension which is a natural generalization of the notion of a k-ary covered extension introduced in Section 3.
Definition 6 A structure M is said to be a finitary covered extension of a collection R of structures if (i)
M is an extension of R (ii) for every finite subset S of the universe of M , there is a structure in R containing S. We then call R as a finitary cover of M .
If M is a finitary covered extension of R, then R is necessarily non-empty. Further, M is the unique finitary covered extension of R since all predicates and function symbols have finite arity. Finally, M is also a k-ary covered extension of R for all k ∈ N.
Definition 7 A class S of structures is said to be preserved under finitary covered ex
It is easy to see that PCE ⊆ PCE f . Since PCE contains non-FO definable classes, these are also in PCE f and hence let P CE f denote the collection of FO definable classes in PCE f . As usual, we identify classes in P CE f with their defining FO sentences. We now have the following duality result similar to Lemma 1. The proof is exactly like the proof of the latter -just replace 'k' in the latter proof by 'finite'.
Lemma 4 (PSC f -PCE f duality). A class S of structures is in
Lemma 4 and Theorem 7 give us the following characterization of P CE f .
Theorem 8. A sentence is in
We remark that this result has an alternate proof very similar to that of Theorem 4. We now get a result analogous to Corollary 5.
Finally, we have Lemma 5 below analogous to Lemma 3.
Lemma 5. For every recursive function
Proof : Suppose there is a recursive function f : N → N such that if φ ∈ P CE f , then φ ∈ P CE(k) for some k ≤ f (|φ|). Then consider the function g : N → N given by g(n) = f (n + 1). Clearly g is also a recursive function. Now let φ be a sentence in P SC f . We will show that φ ∈ P SC(k) for some k ≤ g(|φ|). This would contradict Lemma 3 and complete our proof. Since φ ∈ P SC f , by Lemma 4, it follows that ¬φ ∈ P CE f . Then by our assumption above, ¬φ ∈ P CE(k) for some k ≤ f (|¬φ|) = f (1+|φ|) = g(|φ|). Then by Corollary 2, we have φ ∈ P SC(k) for some k ≤ g(|φ|).
.
Generalizations to formulae and theories
In this section, we generalize the semantic classes P SC, P CE and various subclasses of these seen earlier. This is done by relaxing the meaning of FO definability to include definability by theories (as opposed to definability by FO sentences used so far). Specifically, the classes P SC f , P SC, P SC(k), P CE f , P CE and P CE(k) are now (re-)defined to be subclasses of PSC f , PSC, PSC(k), PCE f , PCE and PCE(k), respectively, that are definable by FO theories. While a theory is conventionally a set of sentences, we define a theory with free variablesx to be a set of FO formulae, each of which has free variablesx. Let T (x) be a τ -theory with free variablesx, and let T ′ be the τ ntheory obtained by replacing each x i with c i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where n = |x| and the c i 's are fresh constant symbols. For each class C in {P SC f , P SC, P SC(k), P CE f , P CE, P CE(k)}, we say that T ∈ C iff T ′ ∈ C. The above generalizations of semantic classes lead to natural generalizations of the preservation theorems seen earlier. The proof of each part of Theorem 9 is obtained by a straightforward adaptation of the proof of the corresponding theorem it generalizes. Putting k = 0 in Theorem 9(2), we obtain the extensional version of the Łoś-Tarski theorem for theories with free variables. The proof of equivalence of P CE and P CE f for FO sentences (see Corollary 6) can be easily adapted to work for FO formulae as well. However, as Lemma 6 shows, P CE f strictly subsumes P CE for FO theories.
Lemma 6. P CE P CE f for FO theories.
Proof : That P CE ⊆ P CE f for theories is obvious. To prove the lemma, we present a theory of Π 0 1 sentences that is not equivalent to any theory of ∀ k ∃ * sentences, for any k ∈ N. Let T be a Π 0 1 theory over graphs that asserts that there is no cycle of length k for any k ∈ N. The theory T defines the class S of all acyclic graphs. If T is equivalent to a theory of ∀ k ∃ * sentences for some k ∈ N, then by Theorem 9(2), S must be in P CE(k). Hence, by Lemma 1, S (the complement of S) must be in PSC(k). Now consider a cycle G of length k + 1. Clearly, G ∈ S, although every proper substructure of G is in S. This contradicts that S ∈ PSC(k).
In contrast to the syntactic characterizations for theories in P CE and P CE f , we do not yet have syntactic characterizations for theories in P SC(k) and P SC f . The proof of Theorem 2 for sentences can be easily adapted to work for individual formulae in P SC(k). Recall that this proof proceeds by characterizing the negations of sentences in P SC(k). Unfortunately, the same approach cannot be taken for characterizing theories in P SC(k) because negations of theories need not be theories, as implied by the following result. Thus, if a theory T in P SC(k) defines a class S of structures, then while it is certain that S ∈ PCE(k), it need not be that S ∈ P CE(k). Hence S need not be definable by a theory. In which case, the characterization for theories in P CE(k) cannot be applied. A natural proposal for characterizing theories T in P SC(k) is to assert that T is equivalent to a theory of ∃ k ∀ * sentences. However, consider the theory T = {∃xE(x, x), ∃y¬E(y, y)} and a graph G = (V, E) = ({a, b}, {(a, a)}). It is easy to check that G cannot have a core of size 1. Thus, T / ∈ P SC(1), and the proposal is falsified. A modified proposal asserts that T ∈ P SC(k) iff T is equivalent to an infinitary logic sentence of the form ∃ kx i∈I ψ i (x), where I is a set of indices and ψ i is a Π 0 1 formula with free variablesx, for each i ∈ I. It is easy to check that any sentence of this form is indeed in P SC(k). However, we have not yet been able to prove the converse. In the next section, we suggest a possible approach to the problem of characterizing theories in P SC(k) and P SC f .
Characterizations using Interpolants
Given a theory T ∈ P S, an interesting question is: Does there exist a finite subset of T which also is in P S? The following is a recent unpublished result by Parikh that he proved in our discussions with him (see [7] for a proof).
Theorem 10 (Parikh). There is a theory in P S s.t. no finite subset of it is in P S.
Given a theory T ∈ P S, call a finite subset S of T as well-behaved if S is in P S. Then Theorem 10 shows that there may not exist any well-behaved finite subset of T . We will however show below that for each finite subset S of T , there always exists, an underapproximation of it implied by T which is well-behaved. In other words, there is a sentence ξ S such that (i) T → ξ S and ξ S → S (ii) ξ S ∈ P S. Towards this, we recall from the literature [8] that, given theories Z and T and a sentence ψ, a sentence ξ is said to be an interpolant between T and ψ modulo Z if Z ⊢ (T → ξ ∧ ξ → ψ). If Z is empty, then ξ is simply called an interpolant between T and ψ. The following result is a simple generalization of a result from [8] . There, the result below appears with a sentence instead of T . We adopt two conventions in what follows: (a) S ⊆ f T denotes that S is a finite subset of T . (b) We identify a finite theory with the (finite) conjunction of the sentences in it. Now, taking Z to be empty and ψ to be S, one sees that condition (1) of Proposition 4 is true, yielding the following.
Corollary 7.
Given a theory T ∈ P S and S ⊆ f T , there exists a Π 0 1 interpolant ξ S between T and S.
Indeed ξ S is the well-behaved underapproximation of S we had referred to above. Interestingly then, for a theory in P S, while the Łoś-Tarski theorem for theories states the existence of a universal theory equivalent to T , we can actually construct one such theory using the interpolants guaranteed by Corollary 7.
Theorem 11. Let T be theory in P S and ξ S be a Π 0 1 interpolant between T and S for S ⊆ f T . Then T is equivalent to V = {ξ S | S ⊆ f T }.
We now present a result similar to Proposition 4, which can be seen as a generalization of a dual version of the proposition. The proof below uses ideas similar to those used in proving Theorem 4.
Proposition 5.
Let Z, T be theories and ψ be a sentence. Then given k ∈ N, the following are equivalent:
Let R be a k-ary cover (resp. finitary cover) of M . Suppose M |= Z and for each
2 ) interpolant ξ between T and ψ modulo Z.
Proof : We give the proof for k-ary covers only. The proof for finitary covers is analogous. Also the proofs modulo theories Z are analogous to the proof below which considers Z as empty.
(2) → (1): Since N |= T for each N ∈ R and since ξ is an interpolant between T and ψ, we have that N |= ξ for each N ∈ R. Since ξ is a ∀ k ∃ * sentence, ξ ∈ P CE(k). Then M |= ξ, as R is a k-ary cover of M . Finally since ξ is an interpolant between T and ψ, M |= ψ.
(1) → (2): Let Γ be the set of all ∀ k ∃ * consequences of T . We will show that Γ → ψ. Then by the compactness theorem, a finite conjunction of sentences in Γ would imply ψ. Since Γ is closed under finite conjunctions, we would get a single ∀ k ∃ * sentence in Γ which would imply ψ. We can take this sentence to be the desired interpolant ξ. Suppose M |= Γ . By Corollary 4, there is a β−saturated elementary extension M + of M for some β ≥ ω. Then M + |= Γ . By Lemma 2, there exists a k-ary cover R of M + such that N |= T for every N ∈ R. Then by the premises as stated in (1), M + |= ψ. As M + and M are elementarily equivalent, M |= ψ. This shows that Γ → ψ.
This result gives the following alternate proof of Theorem 9 for theories.
Theorem 12. Given a theory
A natural question to ask in view of the above results is: Given a theory T in P SC(k) does there exist a ∃ k ∀ * interpolant between T and S for S ⊆ f T ? We have no answer to this question yet. If this is true, then analogous to Theorem 12, we would have that if T ∈ P SC(k), then T is equivalent to a theory of ∃ k ∀ * sentences. For theories T in P SC(k), one can even ask the following weaker question: Given S ⊆ f T , does there exist a Σ As stated in the beginning of the report, by τ we will always mean a finite vocabulary. We first introduce some notations. Given a τ -structure M , we denote by τ M , the vocabulary obtained by expanding τ with |M | fresh constants -one constant per element of M . Given a τ -structure R such that M ⊆ R, we denote by R M , the τ M structure whose τ -reduct is R and in which the constant in τ M \ τ corresponding to an element a of M is interpreted as a. In particular therefore, M M is a τ M -structure whose τ -reduct is M and in which every element of the universe is an interpretation for some constant in τ M \ τ . By S (Σ,n) (M ), we mean the set of all Σ 0 n sentences true in M . Likewise, S (Π,n) (M ) denotes the set of all Π 0 n sentences true in M . With the above notations, one can see that for any structure M , the diagram of M , denoted Diag(M ), can be defined as
. By M ⇛ n R, we mean that every Σ 0 n sentence that is true in M is also true in R. Equivalently, every Π 0 n sentence that is true in R is also true in M . Using the notation just introduced, M ⇛ n R iff R |= S (Σ,n) (M ) iff M |= S (Π,n) (R). By M ≡ n R, we mean that M and R agree on all sentences in Σ 0 n and Π 0 n . That is, M ≡ n R iff M ⇛ n R and R ⇛ n M . Finally, M n R denotes that M ⊆ R and for every Σ 0 n formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x r ) and every r-tupleā from M , R |= ϕ(ā) iff M |= ϕ(ā). Using the notation above, M n R iff M ⊆ R and R M ≡ n M M . Using the fact that Σ 0 n formulae contain both Σ 9 n−1 and Π 0 n−1 formulae, it can be shown easily that ≡ n in the definition of n can be replaced with ⇛ n to get an equivalent definition of n . Thus,
The notations R M , n and ⇛ n already appear in the literature (see [8] ) and mean the same as what we have mentioned above. The notations S (Σ,n) (M ) and S (Π,n) (M ) have been introduced by us since they will be referred to in a number of places in the remainder of this report. It is easy to see M n R implies that M n−1 R. Next, M ≡ R iff M ≡ n R for each n ∈ N. Likewise, M R iff M n R for each n ∈ N. For n = 1, the notion of n has a special name in the literature (see [1] ): M is said to be existentially closed (e.c.) in R iff M 1 R. There are many studies in the literature on this notion. The reader is referred to [1] for details. We provide below are some results concerning the n relation. We have not encountered these in the literature but these are simple generalizations of the corresponding results in the literature concerning e.c. (see [1] , Pg. 192). In all of the results below, n ∈ N i.e. n is a non-negative integer. 
Then since ϕ is also a F O(τ P ) sentence, P P |= ϕ. Since P n R, we have by Lemma 7 that P P ⇛ n+1 R P and hence R P |= ϕ.
The next lemma gives a kind of converse to Lemma 8. Recall that |M | denotes the cardinality of the universe of M .
where for every element a of M , the constant in τ R corresponding to a is the same as the constant in τ M corresponding to a (and hence the constants in τ R \ τ M correspond exactly to the elements in R that are not in M ). Any finite subset of S (Π,n) (R R ), resp. El-diag(M ), is satisfiable by R R , resp. M . Hence consider any finite subset Z of T which has a non-empty intersection with both S (Π,n) (R R ) and El-diag(M ) . Since S (Π,n) (R R ) and El-diag(M ) are each closed under finite conjunctions, we can consider Z = {ξ, ψ} where ξ ∈ S (Π,n) (R R ) and ψ ∈ El-diag(M ). Let c 1 , . . . , c r be the constants of τ R \ τ M appearing in ξ and consider φ given as φ = ∃x 1 . . . ∃x r ξ [c 1 → x 1 ; . . . ; c r → x r ]. Observe that φ is a Σ 0 n+1 sentence of R M and that R M |= φ. Then since M n+1 R, we have that M M |= φ. Let a 1 , . . . , a r be the witnesses for the variables x 1 , . . . , x r in φ mentioned above. Then interpreting the constants c 1 , . . . , c r as a 1 , . . . , a r , one can check that (M M , a 1 , . . . , a r ) |= Z.
Since Z was arbitrary, by the compactness theorem, T is satisfiable by a τ R -structure N whose universe contains the universe of R. Let N be the τ -reduct of N . Since N |= El-diag(M ), we have M N . Since N |= S (Π,n) (R R ), we have R n N . Finally as for the size of N , we have two cases. If M is finite, then since M N , we have M = R = N so that trivially |N | = |R|. Else if M is infinite, then by the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, N can be chosen such that |N | = |R|, whence |N | = |R|. In either case, therefore |N | = |R|.
As mentioned at the start of this section, the 1 relation has a special name in the literature: M is said to be existentially closed (e.c.) in N iff M 1 R. There is a natural generalization of this notion to general n as follows: We say that M is Σ 0 n -closed in R iff M n R. This notion generalizes the notion of existential closure since M is e.c. in
We can now talk about the following preservation property. The aim of the remainder of this section is to generalize the extensional form of the Łoś-Tarski theorem just mentioned, by providing a syntactic characterization of preservation under Σ 0 n -closures for each n ∈ N, which would give us exactly the class of theories of existential sentences when n = 0. Our proof is a generalization of the proof of the Łoś-Tarski theorem. The proof of the Łoś-Tarski theorem uses the following key theorem. (EAT), ref. [8] ). Let N, P be τ -structures. Then N ⇛ 1 P iff there exists an elementary extension R of P and an isomorphic copy M of N such that M ⊆ R.
Definition 8 (Preservation under Σ
Theorem 13 (Existential Amalgamation Theorem
Towards our proof, we will first prove the following generalization of the EAT. Observe that the statement of EAT is exactly the statement of the lemma below for n = 0.
Theorem 14 (Generalization of EAT).
Let N, P be τ -structures and n ∈ N. Then N ⇛ n+1 P iff there exists an elementary extension R of P and an isomorphic copy M of N such that M n R.
Proof : Choose τ P and τ N such that τ P ∩ τ N = τ . Consider the τ N -structure N N . Consider Z = El-diag(P ) ∪ S (Π,n) (N N ), which is a theory in τ P ∪ τ N . Suppose Z is unsatisfiable. Since S (Π,n) (N N ) is closed under finite conjunctions, by compactness theorem, there is a sentence ψ ∈ S (Π,n) (N N ) such that El-diag(P ) ∪ {ψ} is unsatisfiable . Now let c 1 , . . . , c r be the constants of τ N \ τ appearing in ψ and let ϕ = ∃x 1 . . . ∃x r ψ [c 1 → x 1 ; . . . ; c r → x r ]. It is easy to see that ϕ is a Σ 0 n+1 sentence of F O(τ ) and also that N |= ϕ. Since N ⇛ n+1 P , we have P |= ϕ. Now El-diag(P ) → ¬ψ. Since the constants c 1 , . . . , c r do not appear in τ P , we have by ∀-introduction that El-diag(P ) → ∀x 1 . . . ∀x r ¬ψ [c 1 → x 1 ; . . . ; c r → x r ] = ¬ϕ. Then P |= ¬ϕ. This contradicts the earlier inference that P |= ϕ. Then Z is satisfiable by a (τ P ∪ τ N )-structure, say R = (R, a 1 , . . . , a α , b 1 , . . . , b β ) where (i) R is a τ -structure (ii) a 1 , . . . , a α are the interpretations of the constants in τ P \ τ and {a 1 , . . . , a α } is exactly the universe of P and finally (iii) b 1 , . . . , b β are the interpretations of the constants in τ N \ τ and β = |N |. Then P R. Since (R, b 1 , . . . , b β ) |= Z, and hence S (Π,n) (N N ), and since Diag(N N ) ⊆ S (Π,n) (N N ), it follows that the substructure M of R formed by b 1 , . . . , b β is isomorphic to N and that the universe of M is exactly {b 1 , . . . , b β }. Since M is a τ -structure which is isomorphic to N , we can treat τ M and τ N as identical. Then N N ∼ = M M and the structure (R, b 1 , . . . , b β ) can be treated as R M . We will now show that M n R to complete the proof.
Putting n = 1 in the statement of the above lemma, we get the following.
Corollary 10.
Let N, P be τ -structures. Then N ⇛ 2 P iff there exists an elementary extension R of P and an isomorphic copy M of N such that M is e.c. in R.
A slight digression before proceeding ahead: By a little modification of the proof of Theorem 14, in particular, by considering n≥0 S (Π,n) (N N ) instead of S (Π,n) (N N ), we can show the following. Theorem 15. Let N, P be τ -structures. Then N ≡ P iff there exists an elementary extension R of P and an isomorphic copy M of N such that M R.
This shows that though two elementarily equivalent structures may not be related by an elementary substructure relation, it is always possible to elementarily extend one of them such that the extension contains an isomorphic copy of the other structure as an elementary substructure.
Having proved Theorem 14, wee are now ready to give a syntactic characterization of preservation under Σ Then φ is of the form ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n ξ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) where ξ is a Π 0 n formula of F O(τ ). Since M |= φ, there exists an n-tupleā from M such that M |= ξ(ā). Then since M is Σ 0 n -closed in R, we have R |= ξ(ā) (by definition). Then R |= φ. Since φ was an arbitrary sentence of Z, we have R |= Z. Only If: Let Γ be the set of all Σ 0 n+1 consequences of T . Clearly T → Γ . In the converse direction, suppose P |= Γ . We will show that P |= T to complete the proof. Consider the F O(τ ) theory Z = T ∪ S (Π,n+1) (P ) and suppose that Z is unsatisfiable. Since S (Π,n+1) (P ) is closed under finite conjunctions, by compactness theorem, there is φ ∈ S (Π,n+1) (P ) such that T ∪ {φ} is unsatisfiable. Then T → ¬φ. If ϕ = ¬φ, then ϕ is equivalent to a Σ 0 n+1 sentence. Then ϕ ∈ Γ and hence P |= ϕ. Then P |= φ -a contradiction. Then Z is satisfiable in a structure say N . Hence, N |= T and N ⇛ n+1 P . By Theorem 14, there exists an elementary extension R of P and an isomorphic copy M of N such that M n R. Then M is Σ 0 n -closed in R. Since N |= T and M ∼ = N , we have M |= T . Since T is preserved under Σ 0 n -closures and since R is a Σ 0 n -closure of M , we have R |= T . Finally since P R, we have P |= T .
Putting n = 0 in the above result, we get the extensional form of the Łoś-Tarski theorem. Theorem 16 therefore gives us a different generalization of the extensional form of the Łoś-Tarski theorem than the one given by Theorem 9.
A Comparison with Literature:
While we have not encountered the above characterization of Σ 0 n theories in the literature, we remark that the motivation came from our trying to prove the following theorem from [8] where the theorem is given as an exercise problem. In this section, we will prove that for each theory in P SC f and P SC(k) for each k ∈ N, there exists an equivalent theory consisting of only Σ 0 2 sentences. This result therefore makes partial progress on the problem posed in Section 6, of getting a syntactic characterization of theories in P SC f and P SC(k). We repeat below some of the results from the literature that we had recalled in Section 4, for the sake of convenience of reading and quick reference. 
The following result is a simple extension of a result from [1] .
Proposition 6. Let M be an infinite structure that is α-saturated for some α ≥ ω. Then for each subset Y of the universe of M , of size < α, each set of formulas
Before proceeding with the technical details, we first give the outline of our proof. From the characterization of Σ 0 n theories given by Theorem 16 in the previous section, we know that a theory T is equivalent to a theory of Σ 0 2 sentences iff T is preserved under Σ 0 1 -closures. Therefore to show that a theory T in P SC f or P SC(k) has an equivalent theory consisting of only Σ 0 2 sentences, we show that theories in P SC f and P SC(k) are preserved under Σ 0 1 -closures. This is achieved as follows: To show that (M 1 |= T and M 1 1 R 1 ) → R 1 |= T for structures M 1 and R 1 , we show that there exist structures M and R such that M is α-saturated for some α ≥ ω, M ≡ M 1 , R ≡ R 1 and M 1 R. This is proved in Lemma 10 below. It then suffices to prove that T is preserved under Σ 0 1 -closures of α-saturated models for each α ≥ ω. This is shown in Lemma 11. And that completes the proof.
We now give all the technical details. Recall that M is said to be existentially closed (e.c.) in R if M 1 R. N,ā) . Now since N is β-saturated, (N,ā) is also β-saturated by Proposition 1. Further since β ≥ |N 1 | and R ⊆ N 1 , we have β ≥ |R|, whence β ≥ |(R,b)|. Then by Theorem 6, (R,b) is isomorphically embeddable in (N,ā) via an isomorphic embedding f . Then the image of (R,b) under f is a structure (R 1 ,ā) such that R 1 is a τ -structure, R 1 ⊆ N and R 1 contains C. Since C is a core of N , R 1 ∈ S by definition. Finally, since R 1 is isomorphic to R and S is closed under isomorphisms, we have R ∈ S. Proof : Suppose M 1 ∈ S and M 1 is e.c. in R 1 . We will show that R 1 ∈ S. If M 1 is finite, then suppose it has n elements, say a 1 , . . . , a n . Let φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) = ∀y i=n i=1 (y = x i ). Now observe that M 1 |= φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ). Since M 1 is e.c. in R 1 and since φ is a Π 0 1 formula, R 1 |= φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ). Then M 1 = R 1 , whence R 1 ∈ S. Else M 1 and R 1 are both infinite. Then by Lemma 10 there exist structures M and R such that (i) M is α-saturated for some α ≥ ω (ii) M is e.c. in R (iii) M 1 M and R 1 is elementarily embeddable in R. Since S is closed under elementary extensions and M 1 ∈ S, we have M ∈ S. Then invoking Lemma 11, we get R ∈ S. Finally, since S is closed under elementary substructures and isomorphisms, and hence elementary embeddings, R 1 ∈ S.
. Corollary 11. Let T be a theory in P SC f or P SC(k) for some k ∈ N. Then T is preserved under Σ 0 1 -closures.
Proof : Since T is a theory, it is closed under elementary extensions, elementary substructures and isomorphisms. Invoking Lemma 12, we are done.
Theorem 18. Let T be a theory in P SC f or P SC(k) for some k ∈ N. Then T is equivalent to a theory of Σ 
Some other results:
Using the ideas in the proofs above and in the previous subsection, we can prove the following result which is closely related to Lemma 9, but which involves saturated structures. Proof : If M 1 is finite, then in a manner similar to that in the proof of Lemma 12, we can show that M 1 = R 1 . Since by Proposition 2 every finite structure is α-saturated for all cardinals α, we can choose M = N = R = M 1 and see that they are indeed as desired. Else M 1 is infinite. By exactly the same kind of arguments as presented in the proof of Lemma 10 (in fact just do the following replacements in the latter proof:
; 'is e.c. in' → n ), we can show that there exist M , R, α and β such that (i) M is α-saturated and
M and R 1 is elementarily embeddable in R. To get N as desired, we see that since M n R, by Lemma 9, there exists N 1 such that M N 1 , M n R n−1 N 1 and |N 1 | = |R| = β. Then by Theorem 5, there exists a β-saturated elementary extension N of N 1 of power 2 β . Since R n N 1 , we have R n N . Finally, since M N 1 , we have M N . 9.1 Σ 0 2 theories are more general than theories in P SC f and P SC(k) While theories in P SC f and P SC(k) are equivalent to Σ 0 2 theories, the vice-versa unfortunately is not true. In fact, the following lemma reveals a dark fact -even theories of ∃∀ * sentences can go beyond P SC f ! Lemma 14. There is a theory of Σ 0 2 sentences in which each sentence has exactly one existential variable and which is not in P SC f .
Proof : For n ≥ 1, let ϕ n (x) be a formula which asserts that x is not a part of a cycle of length n. Explicitly stated, ϕ 1 (x) = ¬E(x, x) and for n ≥ 1,
which asserts that φ n is not a part of any cycle of length ≤ n. Observe that φ n (x) → φ m (x) if m ≤ n. Finally consider ψ n = ∃xφ n (x) which asserts that φ n (x) is realized in any model. Let T = {ψ n | n ≥ 1}. Then T is a theory of Σ 0 2 sentences in which each Σ 0 2 sentence has only one existential variable. We will show below that T / ∈ P SC f . Consider a infinite graph G given by C i where C i is a cycle of length i and denotes disjoint union. Any vertex of C i satisfies φ j (x) for j < i, since it is not a part of any cycle of length < i. Then G |= T . Now consider any finite set S of vertices of G. Let k be the highest index such that some vertex in S is in the cycle C k . Then consider the subgraph G 1 of G induced by the vertices of all the cycles in G of length ≤ k. Then no vertex of G satisfies φ l (x) for l ≥ k. Then G 1 |= T whence S cannot be a core of G. Since S was an arbitrary finite subset of G, we conclude that G has no finite core. Then T / ∈ P SC f (and hence / ∈ P SC(k) for any k ∈ N).
This shows that allowing an infinite number of sentences in a Σ 0 2 theory to use existential variables can afford power to the theory to have models that do not have any finite cores. Ofcourse if the number of Σ 0 2 sentences using existential variables is finite, then these sentences can be "clubbed" together to get a single equivalent Σ theory which is known to be in P SC f , resp. P SC(k), is it the case that it is equivalent to a Σ 0 2 theory containing only one Σ 0 2 sentence, resp. only one Σ 0 2 sentence with k existential variables, and the rest of the sentences are all universal? If so, then since Theorem 18 tells us that theories in P SC f and P SC(k) are certainly equivalent to Σ 0 2 theories (which would also therefore be in P SC f and P SC(k) resp.), the special kind of Σ 0 2 theories mentioned in the question just stated would give us the desired characterizations. However, we do not have an answer to this question.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented preservation theorems that characterize the ∃ k ∀ * and ∀ k ∃ * prefix classes of FO. These theorems can be viewed as generalizations of the substructual and extensional versions of the Łoś-Tarski theorem. Our results contrast with earlier characterizations of Σ A few open questions remain in the context of FO theories. Important among these are syntactic characterizations of FO theories in P SC(k) and in P SC f , and an understanding of whether P SC f strictly subsumes P SC for FO theories. It is also interesting that the semantic notions of P SC(k) and P CE(k) remain non-trivial over classes of finite structures. This contrasts with other semantic notions (like those mentioned above) that have been used earlier to characterize Σ 0 2 and Π 0 2 over arbitrary structures, but reduce to trivial properties over any class of finite structures (see Appendix A for details). This motivates investigating classes of finite structures over which P SC(k) and P CE(k) semantically characterize ∃ k ∀ * and ∀ k ∃ * sentences respectively. Some such classes were considered in [6] . Further investigations in this direction would be a natural extension of recent work on preservation theorems over special classes of finite structures [9, 10] .
of their models, we obtain the substructual and extensional versions of the Łoś-Tarski theorem as special cases. In addition, the notions of P SC(k) and P CE(k) remain nontrivial over the class of all finite structures, amongst other classes of finite structures. In other words, for each k, there are atleast two sentences such that, over the class of all finite structures, one of these sentences is in P SC(k) and the other is not (likewise for P CE(k)). Any sentence in P SC(k) over arbitrary structures would also be in P SC(k) over all finite structures (likewise for P CE(k)). As an example of a sentence that is not in P SC(k), consider the sentence φ = ∀x∃yE(x, y). Let G be a cycle of length k + 1. This is a model of φ. However, no proper induced subgraph G ′ of G is a model of φ since G ′ must contain a vertex which has no outgoing edge. Then the only core of G is the set of all vertices of G -but this has size k + 1. This shows that φ / ∈ P SC(k). (In fact, this argument shows that φ / ∈ P SC). Likewise, by Corollary 2, ψ = ∃x∀yE(x, y) / ∈ P CE(k) (in fact, ψ / ∈ P CE). This motivates studying classes of finite structures over which P SC(k) and P CE(k) do form semantic characterizations of the Σ 0 2 and Π 0 2 classes of FO (the notions in the literature mentioned above surely cannot give us characterizations for these classes). Indeed, characterizations of Σ 0 2 using P SC(k) were obtained over some interesting classes of finite structures in [6] .
